British Columbia’s CreativeBC program fails to help aspiring artists and instead gives funds to already established performers and questionable workshop events. The Career Development Program has supported 875 grants, totalling $9.8 million since its inception in 2018.

Problem

The program has the intention of helping and promoting BC’s creative industries, such as aspiring artists, and boosting investment in the province. However, it allows individuals and organizations to get funds they do not need from the BC government. This is particularly true for the “Established Artist” grant under the Career Development program and the Music Industry Initiative.

Solution

1: Terminate the program.

Artists/Groups should be income-tested at a fixed rate of $75,000 in net income from their commercial music activities to receive funding from CreativeBC.

Explore the Investigation

Dive deeper into Coastal Front’s reporting on public funding for BC’s creative industries, examining government subsidies, financial transparency, and the accountability of taxpayer-supported programs.

01 | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT — MAY 2025

Taxpayers Fund Billions in Film Subsidies — But BC Keeps the Details Scattered

An examination of nearly $5 billion in provincial film and television tax credits between 2018 and 2024, revealing fragmented financial reporting and raising questions about transparency, industry benefits, and the return on public investment.

Established in 1970, the Municipal Finance Authority of BC (“MFA BC”) was created to provide low-cost financing to municipalities across the province. As per the most recent S&P Global Ratings report: “The authority, unlike peer public sector funding agencies, has taxing powers. MFABC has the unfettered ability to impose a provincewide levy on all taxable land and improvements to replenish its DRF, if needed.” Today, the credit rating of MFA BC is ‘AAA’, while the Province of British Columbia is now ‘A+’.

Problem

MFA BC is a not-for-profit, tax-exempt corporation without share capital controlled by its member municipalities. While the Authority has fulfilled this mandate, it has also accumulated significant untaxed cash reserves and investment assets (see below).

Solution(s)

1: End tax exemption.

Assuming a 12% provincial corporate tax rate, MFA BC would have paid a total of $38.5 million to the Province of BC in the past two years.

and

2: Mandate greater financial transparency.

Example: MFA BC has 19 employees listed on their website, whose combined annual income was $4.9 million in 2024. This is the equivalent to $256,684/year per employee.

Established under the BC NDP in 1998, British Columbia’s Offshore School Program grew from one school to a peak of forty-five, with the majority of its growth occurring under the BC Liberals. Today, there are 37 schools operating in 12 countries; 23 of these schools, or 62%, operate within mainland China.

Problem

This program reportedly operates on a cost-recovery model. However, the accuracy of these cost recoveries is questionable. There are no quantifiable attempts to measure this program’s success. There is clear evidence that the BC curriculum has been modified for students in mainland China.

Private, for-profit, operators charge $13,000–$14,000/year in tuition fees and generate tens of millions in revenue off of the strength and credibility of BC’s Dogwood Diploma. The Province of BC does not receive any tax revenue from these offshore profits.

Solution(s)

1: Convert to for-profit model

As of 2023, the Province of BC recovered an average of $4.97 million annually from the offshore schools program. Simply applying a “Cost Recovery + 20%” model to this existing program, would allow students abroad to continue learning the BC curriculum and easily generate more than $1 million annually.

or

2: Terminate the program.

Explore the Investigation

Dive deeper into Coastal Front’s reporting on BC’s Offshore School Program, from its financial implications to ongoing questions about government oversight and transparency.

01 | ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION — NOVEMBER 2023

Private Profits, Unclear Benefits for BC

An examination of private operators, provincial oversight, and the financial benefits of BC’s offshore schools.

02 | FOLLOW-UP REPORT — FEBRUARY 2024

Foreign Profits Clear, Benefits at Home Still Murky

New information from the province raises further questions about the program’s value to British Columbians.

03 | TRANSPARENCY UPDATE — MAY 2024

BC’s Offshore Schools: Redactions and Unanswered Questions

A freedom-of-information request yields 99 pages of documents, 94 of them entirely redacted.

Established under the BC Liberals in 2015, the BC Training and Education Savings Grant (“BCTESG”) is marketed as a universal $1,200 grant for families to support post-secondary savings. In practice, the program disproportionately benefits wealthy families — those who are already engaged with financial institutions, already saving, and already likely to send their children to college. Meanwhile, the families who need help most aren’t getting it.

Problem

There are two seemingly minor barriers to entry to access these funds. A parent must:

1. Establish a SIN for their child and open a RESP account.

2. Complete and submit the Employment and Social Development Canada, BCTESG Application Form; Annex D.

As of December 2023, a total of 263,550 children have received the BCTESG. As quoted by the Ministry of Education and Child Care: “The more than $316 million in grants issued, represents approximately 50% of the estimated eligible cohorts.”

The process for applying is a high barrier to entry for low-income, newcomer, and less financially literate families. In other words, the $1,200 “universal” grant is functionally gated.

Solution(s)

1: Needs-test to save money.

• Example: Families who have a combined taxable income of $200,000 do not qualify.

or

2: Expand eligibility timeframe.

• Currently, the application window is between the ages of 6 to 9. Expanding the application timeframe from 0 to 24 years ensures all eligible children have sufficient time to apply.

or

3: Terminate the program.

• Savings = $30 million plus overhead and administrative costs.

Watch the Investigation

Explore Coastal Front’s examination of BC’s Training and Education Savings Grant, revealing how a program intended to support families across the province may disproportionately benefit those who need financial assistance the least.

01 | VIDEO INVESTIGATION — SEPTEMBER 2026

BC’s Rich Got Hundreds of Millions. The Poor Got Nothing.

A closer look at the distribution of hundreds of millions in provincial education savings grants, examining why wealthier families have been better positioned to access the funding while many eligible lower-income families remain underserved.

The BC Indigenous Language Revitalization Program is a provincial initiative designed to preserve, protect, and restore the 34 Indigenous languages spoken across British Columbia.

In Budget 2018, BC allocated a $50-million grant to the First Peoples’ Cultural Council (FPCC) to help revitalize Indigenous languages in British Columbia.

In 2025, the BC government announced $15 million per year, ongoing, to the First Peoples’ Cultural Council to support First Nations languages, heritage, arts and cultural programming. This includes $12 million per year dedicated to addressing language revitalization.

Problem

The program is too small to justify spending millions of dollars, and success for the program has been loosely defined.

According to a 2022 First Peoples’ Cultural Council fact sheet, there were 17,103 active learners of Indigenous languages in the province. In 2018, there were 13,997. Being conservative, the province spent $50 million to bring in 3,106 new active learners. This was done at $16,098/learner. In contrast, the total tuition for a four-year carpentry apprenticeship program at BCIT amounts to $4,570.

There is also no clear metric to define what a learner is. While there is a Language Status Assessment to understand, plan, and track the health of the languages, there is no direct linguistic proficiency testing to see if an Indigenous learner has become fluent.

This excessive cost per learner, combined with ambiguity surrounding those actively learning Indigenous languages, presents questions about the fiscal soundness of this policy.

Solution(s)

1: Reduce funding by 50% for the program and require quantitative measures of performance and competency

• Savings = $6 million per year

or

2: Terminate the program

• Savings = $12 million per year

Explore the Investigation

Dive deeper into Coastal Front’s examination of BC’s Indigenous language revitalization initiatives, exploring government funding commitments, program effectiveness, and how success is measured.

01 | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT — OCTOBER 2025

BC Pledges $12M for Indigenous Language Revitalization, Lacks Plan to Measure Success

An examination of BC’s ongoing funding commitments to Indigenous language preservation, raising questions about the cost per learner, measurable outcomes, and accountability for public expenditures.

​​Metro Vancouver is a diverse organization that plans for and delivers regional utility services, including water, sewers and wastewater treatment, and solid waste management. On its board currently, there are 41 Directors representing 21 Municipalities, one Electoral Area, and one treaty First Nation.

Problem

The board’s large size limits its ability to address issues efficiently and effectively. It is significantly larger than most other boards in the Lower Mainland.

Metro Vancouver, with its $2.7B operating budget, has 41 board members. By contrast, Translink has a similar operating budget but only 11 board members. Even better, BC Hydro, with its $7.5B operating budget, has only 9 board members.

Research suggests that larger boards don’t necessarily improve performance. A study of 327 S&P 500 companies from 2013–2017 found a negative correlation between board size and corporate success.

According to the 2024 Metro Vancouver Financial Statements, directors made $1,238,408 in remuneration for an average of $27,520 per director. If Metro Vancouver reduced the board of directors to 10, consistent with BC Hydro and Translink, the province would save $963,206.

Solution

1: Reduce the board of directors from 41 to 10

• Savings = $963,206

Explore the Investigation

Dive deeper into Coastal Front’s reporting on Metro Vancouver’s governance structure, examining board member compensation, the efficiency of its 41-member board, and opportunities to reduce costs and improve fiscal accountability.

01 | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT — OCTOBER 2025

Metro Vancouver Board Payouts Reach Tens of Thousands, Analysis Shows

An analysis of Metro Vancouver’s financial records reveals significant disparities in board member compensation, with some directors receiving more than $70,000 annually, raising questions about taxpayer-funded remuneration, governance efficiency, and the necessity of its 41-member board.

The province of British Columbia operates a network of International Trade and Investment Representative offices. These offices are staffed by Trade and Investment Representatives (TIRs), whose role is to facilitate connections and serve as a bridge between BC businesses and foreign markets, as well as to attract investment into BC. There are 23 foreign locations around the world.

Problem

Recently disclosed financial data provides the clearest available snapshot, showing that the Province of BC spent $10,437,532.72 in FY2024 operating these trade offices globally.

There is also no publicly available financial statement or annual report for Trade & Invest BC. This lack of disclosure limits transparency and prevents British Columbians from understanding how their tax dollars are being spent.

Nearly all employees working for Trade & Invest BC offices abroad are foreign workers. Unlike public servants who work in our province, the BC government does not collect income tax from these foreign workers.

Solution(s)

1: Reduce the number of trade offices by 30% and develop a quantitative metric to determine the effectiveness of the remaining trade offices

Savings = to be determined based on which offices are closed

or

2: Shut down all the offices

Savings = up to ~$10.4 million per year

Explore the Investigation

Dive deeper into Coastal Front’s reporting on BC’s overseas trade and investment offices, examining millions in taxpayer expenditures, government accountability, and the effectiveness of the province’s international trade strategy.

01 | ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION — FEBRUARY 2024

BC’s Asian Trade Offices Rack Up $27 Million Tab

A freedom-of-information investigation reveals that BC spent more than $27 million operating its Asian trade offices over five years, raising questions about transparency, measurable outcomes, and the return on taxpayer investment.

02 | FOLLOW-UP REPORT — OCTOBER 2024

BC’s Overseas Trade Offices: Expansion and Past Spending Scandals

An examination of the province’s expanding overseas trade network and its history of controversial expenditures, scrutinizing decisions made under successive governments and ongoing questions about fiscal accountability.

Cataract surgery is one of the most common medical procedures performed in British Columbia. Due to advances in surgical techniques and equipment, the procedure can now be completed significantly faster than when current Medical Services Plan (MSP) reimbursement rates were established.

Despite these improvements, reimbursement rates for cataract surgery have not been updated to reflect reduced procedure times. As a result, ophthalmologists now account for a disproportionate share of the highest MSP billings in the province.

According to ministry data, cataract surgeries cost British Columbia approximately $26 million per year on average.

Problem

Cataract surgery falls under MSP billing codes S02188 and S02190, which allow ophthalmologists to bill the province $372.20 per procedure.

Modern cataract surgery can now be completed in approximately 10 to 20 minutes, allowing significantly more procedures to be performed in a single day than when the current billing structure was established.

Data provided by the Ministry of Health shows that usage of these billing codes increased from approximately 66,000 procedures in 2020 to 83,000 procedures in 2025, creating growing cost pressure on the healthcare system.

Analysis of the BC MSP Blue Book also shows that ophthalmologists dominate the highest physician billings in the province. Of the top ten highest-billing practitioners in the 2023–2024 fiscal year, nine were ophthalmologists, and more than 40 percent of the top 200 highest billers were in the field.

While ophthalmologists provide important care, the current reimbursement structure appears to reflect outdated assumptions about the time and intensity required to perform cataract surgery.

Solution

Reduce the cataract surgery reimbursement rate by 10% per year for three years in a row.

The province could renegotiate the MSP reimbursement rate for cataract surgery to reflect the shorter time required to perform the procedure today. Advances in technology have significantly reduced surgery time, but the billing code has not been updated. Adjusting the reimbursement rate would reduce costs while maintaining access to care.

Current rate: $372.20

Year 1: $334.98

Year 2: $301.48

Year 3: $271.33

Fiscal Impact

Savings per procedure once fully implemented: $100.87

$100.87 in savings per procedure × 83,000 procedures = $8,372,210

Total Savings: $8,372,210 annually once fully implemented

Explore the Investigation

Discover the research behind Coastal Front’s examination of cataract surgery costs in BC, including rising procedure volumes, physician compensation, and questions surrounding the province’s reimbursement structure.

01 | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT — DECEMBER 2025

Cataract Surgeries Cost BC $26M a Year on Average

An analysis of provincial billing data reveals rising cataract surgery volumes and average annual costs exceeding $26 million, prompting questions about whether physician reimbursement rates adequately reflect advancements in surgical efficiency.

In 2018, the BC government introduced a luxury surtax on high-priced vehicles. Vehicles priced between $125,000 and $149,999.99 are taxed at 15% PST, while vehicles priced at $150,000 or more are taxed at 20% PST.

The policy was intended to increase taxes on higher-income individuals. However, the province does not track how much revenue is generated from the luxury surtax, making it difficult to determine whether the policy is achieving its intended goals.

Problem

The luxury vehicle surtax assumes that buyers will continue purchasing high-priced vehicles despite higher taxes. However, higher prices can change consumer behaviour, potentially reducing luxury vehicle purchases or encouraging buyers to purchase vehicles in other jurisdictions.

Despite these risks, the BC Ministry of Finance does not track revenue from luxury vehicle taxes separately. PST is received in lump sums from ICBC and vehicle dealers, without identifying how much comes from vehicles above the luxury thresholds.

Without this information, the province cannot determine whether the luxury surtax is generating meaningful revenue or discouraging purchases.

Solution(s)

1: Require separate reporting of luxury vehicle tax revenue

The province could require ICBC and vehicle dealers to report PST collected from vehicles priced above $125,000. This would allow the government to measure the revenue generated by the luxury surtax and evaluate whether the policy is effective.

or

2: Eliminate the luxury vehicle surtax

The province could eliminate the luxury surtax and return vehicle taxation to the previous PST structure.

Total savings: Unknown.

Explore the Investigation

Dive deeper into Coastal Front’s reporting on BC’s luxury vehicle tax, examining its financial implications and the province’s ability to measure the policy’s effectiveness.

01 | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT — DECEMBER 2025

BC Can’t Say How Much It Collects in Luxury Car Tax

A Ministry of Finance inquiry reveals that BC does not separately track revenue from its luxury vehicle surtax, raising questions about government oversight, tax effectiveness, and the policy’s financial impact.

The federal government will not collect up to $434.8 million that the Canadian Dental Care Plan (CDCP) has paid, or will pay, for people later found to have had access to private dental coverage. At first, the plan relied on applicants’ word that they lacked that access. The government’s note says only that “a small number” of people are affected. It does not say how many.

A year earlier, the government said something different. The explanatory note to its October 2025 order on dental care debts said: “The standard funds recovery process will apply to any future instances where individuals are found to be ineligible for CDCP services received.”

The new order was made September 25.

What is being forgiven

A remission order is one way cabinet cancels a debt owed to the government. The Financial Administration Act allows it, on the Treasury Board’s recommendation, when cabinet considers collection “unreasonable or unjust” or considers that “it is otherwise in the public interest” to remit the debt. This order relies on the first ground: it says collection is unreasonable.

This order cancels what the plan paid providers for the affected people’s care, plus interest, across the plan’s first three benefit periods, from May 1, 2024, to June 30, 2027. The note says those who had repaid “will be reimbursed for the debt paid, plus any applicable interest.” The last period hasn’t ended, so the order also covers care that may not have happened yet.

The $434.8 million is an upper estimate, not a tally of money already spent. The note says it is “based on an analysis of member eligibility files and CDCP claims information.”

In its first benefit period, the plan paid $2.1 billion toward care, according to its annual report. As of September 30, 5,015,189 members were enrolled for the 2026 to 2027 benefit period, including 645,410 in BC, Health Canada’s plan statistics show.

How the plan checks who qualifies

The plan covers dental care for people whose adjusted family net income is under $90,000 and who have no access to private dental insurance, such as through work, a pension or a family member’s plan. The CDCP pays the dentist, denturist or hygienist directly.

Applicants attest that they have no access to private coverage. The new order’s note says tax slips for 2022, the tax year used when the plan launched, didn’t report dental coverage. The government’s checks after enrolment found that some people had incorrectly attested. They were removed from the CDCP and, the note says, “notified that they may need to repay the cost of care they received.”

The Dental Care Measures Act took effect in June 2023. Starting with the 2023 tax year, it requires employers and pension plan administrators to state on T4 and T4A slips whether employees, pensioners and their families were eligible for dental coverage offered through them. That doesn’t capture plans people buy themselves. Under a Health Canada administrative policy announced by the Canada Revenue Agency, employers and plan administrators didn’t have to fill in the dental box for 2023 and 2024 when no coverage was offered, if they had made all reasonable efforts to comply.

The annual report says Health Canada and Service Canada “use this information on dental insurance to verify whether applicants are eligible.” The new order’s note says “it is now possible to confirm eligibility before persons are enrolled,” and that the application review process “is being revised” to do so. It doesn’t say when that revision will be done.

Two orders, two groups

The October 2025 order forgave up to $29 million. It covered people who were approved, or charged the wrong co-payment, because of a government error in calculating family income. It also covered people with access to dental insurance who applied before May 1, 2024, when only seniors 70 and older could apply and, the note says, “explanations about CDCP eligibility criteria were being clarified.”

Its income-error relief excluded anyone who “incorrectly attested in their application that they did not have access to dental insurance on or after May 1, 2024,” and its other relief reached only people who applied before that date.

The new order covers people in that position across all three benefit periods, with a ceiling about 15 times the 2025 order’s, though the two cover different groups and periods.

The government’s case

According to the note, those affected generally have low or modest incomes and received “a service covered by the CDCP” rather than a direct payment. Some who were billed told the government the rule was unclear and that “they cannot afford to repay the cost.”

The note says: “Given the reliance on self-attestation during the initial implementation of the CDCP and the inability to distinguish among the circumstances that led to incorrect attestations, pursuing recovery of the resulting debts would, in these circumstances, be unreasonable.” It says it is “not possible to determine with certainty why a person incorrectly attested” that they lacked access to private coverage, “but it is plausible that at least some persons misunderstood this eligibility requirement.” It also says the cost of pursuing the money “may be disproportionate to the amounts recoverable.”

The note concludes: “Therefore, remission represents an efficient and proportionate response that allows resources to be focused on strengthened eligibility verification measures and ongoing program delivery.”

What the order doesn’t say

The order doesn’t say how many people have repaid, how much will be refunded or how much of the estimate is care still to come. Its note doesn’t give the size of individual debts. It says “many of the debts” are “relatively small on an individual basis” but “may be significant to those persons.” It also doesn’t give an estimate of what collecting would cost, or mention the 2025 order. The Auditor General of Canada is scheduled to deliver an audit of the dental care plan to the House of Commons on October 29.

The order approving BC Ferries’ four new ships puts the total project expenditure at “up to [ ],” with empty brackets where the figure should be. The next paragraph says the order and its amounts “shall remain confidential until completion of the project or such a later date as the Commissioner may determine.”

That is Order 25-01, dated March 14, 2025, and issued by BC Ferries Commissioner Eva Hage. Her office, the BC Ferry Commission, is the independent regulator that caps fares and must approve vessel spending over $50 million. Its release called BC Ferries’ five-ship application “the largest proposed capital expenditure in BC Ferries’ history.” She approved four.

On May 7, 2025, China Merchants Industry Weihai Shipyard won four contracts to build them, BC Ferries’ financial report says. The company’s June 2025 technical briefing had all four, since named the Summit Class, in service by summer 2031.

Who pays

In the three months to June 30, about 28 percent of BC Ferries’ revenue came from payments by the province, including a federal-provincial subsidy. The commissioner’s reasons put base government funding at $240 million, “$200 million from the Province and $40 million from the Federal government.” The province also committed $500 million over the current four-year fare term, the period for which the commissioner caps average fare increases.

BC Ferries’ September 30 submission, which the regulator will use to set price caps for the next term, says that money let the commissioner cap increases at 3.2 percent a year, down from a preliminary 9.2 percent. The funding “comes to an end” in March 2028. Public comment runs until February 28, 2027.

The arm’s-length federal Canada Infrastructure Bank adds a below-market loan, up to $690 million for the vessels. On the first $133 million, BC Ferries booked $56.4 million as “government funding to be recognized as an offset to the project costs” of the ships. That is an accounting value for the cheaper rate, not cash. BC Ferries chief executive Nicolas Jimenez said in June 2025 no one could “reverse engineer” the ships’ cost from the loan amounts, CBC reported.

Whose secret

The blackout isn’t a cabinet order. A Transport Canada note calls BC Ferries “a private company, not a provincial Crown corporation”; the BC Ferry Authority holds its sole voting share. The secrecy rests on the regulator’s order and company policy. “Costs are not being disclosed to protect future bids,” BC Ferries’ briefing says, adding that the fixed-price contract “is within the approval limits provided by the BC Ferries Commissioner.” Its fare submission plans two more Summit Class ships, with a shipyard contract expected in the fare term that begins in 2032. That submission also redacts the new-ship figures, down to Summit Class interest costs, along with figures for other projects such as Summit terminal electrification and the Horseshoe Bay program.

The commissioner published redacted reasons and ordered quarterly project reports to her on spending and schedule. The order doesn’t require them to be published, and they aren’t among the routine filings on fares and sailings her office posted this month.

She also refused a fifth vessel. Approving it “would be fiscally irresponsible,” Hage said. Her reasons say the project’s higher capital cost “will cause further upward pressure on future price caps and taxpayer support.” A consultant’s fare estimate for four ships, described as “for illustrative purposes only,” reads “approximately [ ] per year.”

BC Ferries and the commissioner’s office are covered by BC’s freedom-of-information law, though its business-confidentiality exception could apply to the price.

The campaign

Shipbuilding has become a campaign issue. On October 13, the BC NDP pledged to work with Ottawa on a new BC shipyard to “build the next generation of BC Ferries,” citing “up to $250 million available through the Strategic Investment Fund.” The Conservative platform would “Review current fleet renewal contracts,” saying, “We should not be building ships in China.” The Greens promise to “Build and maintain ships locally.”

Responding to a union-commissioned report in September, BC Ferries said building locally “is expected to cost significantly more,” the Times Colonist reported. “Two Canadian shipyards pre-qualified, but neither submitted a final proposal,” a BC Ferries spokesperson told The Free Press. Seaspan chief executive John McCarthy welcomed the NDP plan but said competitors pay “one-eighth of our wages,” and “We don’t subsidize shipbuilding in Canada today,” the North Shore News reported.

None of the three parties has priced a BC-built ferry. The price of the four ships ordered from China is confidential.

The open question

The province supplies most of the base funding, committed the $500 million and, by the commission’s account, sets service levels. Has it seen the approved price?

Every monthly status report the province has posted for the Fraser River Tunnel Project says the same thing: “The estimated cost of the Project is $4.15 billion.”

The project is meant to replace the George Massey Tunnel, which opened in 1959 and carries Highway 99 across the Fraser River. The province says the four-lane tunnel “no longer meets the region’s needs or modern seismic standards,” and it plans an eight-lane immersed-tube tunnel in its place.

The Transportation Investment Corporation (TI Corp), the provincial Crown corporation the province has assigned to procure and deliver the project, says in its service plan that it “provides updates publicly through Monthly Status Reports.” Those updates have carried the same $4.15-billion line in all 22 reports, from September 2024 through June 2026. No July, August or September reports had been posted as of October 19, 2026.

The last one posted, the June 2026 report, covers a month that ended before the province announced a new figure. Yet the PDF’s file metadata show it was created on July 30, 2026, more than three weeks after the Ministry of Transportation and Transit announced an “updated total project budget” of $8.5 billion on July 6. The report does not mention that figure.

Infrastructure BC, a provincial Crown corporation that leads procurement on complex capital projects for public-sector clients, posts this project’s procurement documents. Its project page still listed “Project Budget” and “Project Cost” of $4.15 billion and completion in 2030 when Coastal Front checked it on October 19, 2026. The project’s own overview page shows $8.5 billion and 2031.

That’s two official websites, two cost figures, two completion years.

At $8.5 billion, the new figure is more than double $4.15 billion; the difference is $4.35 billion. The budget’s major capital projects table showed $4,148 million on February 17, 2026, more than two months after a December 2025 memo, published by the BC Conservatives as an Office of the Premier document, said the province now anticipated an $8.5-billion budget.

Ottawa’s share is not settled either. BC has described the contribution as up to $3 billion, but its type and amount were still unconfirmed in September’s quarterly report.

The wording changed; the number did not

Through March 2025, the status reports said the project was “forecast to be delivered within budget.” That sentence disappears from the April 2025 report onward (its file metadata show it was created on June 4, 2025). The $4.15-billion figure stays. From the February 2026 report onward, the reports also say the estimate is “being updated and reviewed,” language Budget 2026 used as well.

So the trackers did flag uncertainty, eventually in red: the June 2026 dashboard marks budget status red while its objective still cites the “$4.15 billion” approved budget. In the reports, the number itself never moved.

Budget 2026 flagged an update and kept the old number

Budget 2026’s fiscal plan for 2026/27 to 2028/29, presented February 17, 2026, said the province was putting “$4.3 billion towards the Highway 99 Tunnel Program” and that “the estimated cost of the project is being updated and reviewed as the design and contract negotiations progress.”

Its capital projects table kept the old estimate. Table 1.8, which lists approved projects with multi-year budgets of $50 million or more, showed the Fraser River Tunnel Project at an anticipated total cost of $4,148 million and a year of completion of 2030. A footnote to the table repeated the update language and added: “Due to commercial sensitivities related to releasing an updated estimate for the project before a contract is executed, the Province will update the project budget and schedule once negotiations with the contractor have concluded.”

The December 2025 memo was published by the BC Conservatives and reported by CTV News, which said in an October 13, 2026 report that it obtained the document. It states: “While the 2021 approved budget was $4.15 billion, BC now anticipates a project budget of $8.5 billion.”

The province announced $8.5 billion on July 6, less than five months after budget day. Treasury Board is a cabinet committee; under TI Corp’s mandate letter, material changes to a project’s budget may need its approval. In September, the First Quarterly Report 2026/27 listed an anticipated total cost of $8,492 million and completion in 2031.

The number the minister would not give

In the legislature’s Committee of Supply on May 7, 2026, Conservative MLA Harman Bhangu asked Transportation Minister Mike Farnworth whether any scenario exceeded $6 billion, $8 billion or $10 billion, and what the highest cost estimate currently was.

Farnworth replied: “It’ll be the same answers I gave earlier, which is that we’ve laid out over the next three budget years how much we’ll be spending on the project. We’re currently working with the contractor on what that final cost is going to be. Those are negotiations on work that is confidential and is currently underway.” Asked whether a federal funding agreement had been finalized since the 2024 election, he said: “We have not received any formal funding offers from the federal government.”

The federal share that is still ‘TBC’

Less than two months later, the federal government set out its commitment. The July 2 Canada–British Columbia Cooperative Prosperity Agreement says Canada “commits to supporting up to one-third of capital costs, to a maximum of $3 billion,” and that this “could involve low-cost financing models or credit facilities in addition to direct financial support.” Its Annex A schedule lists detailed arrangements for the project’s financial commitments as due on or before December 1, 2026.

BC’s July 6 release said Canada “confirms funding contribution of up to $3 billion in capital costs.” By September, BC’s own quarterly report listed the federal share as “TBC.” A footnote in the report says the province has begun negotiations “to confirm the type and amount of commitment towards the project.”

One partner, then five packages

Under the original progressive design-build model, the construction price could only come from Cross Fraser Partnership, chosen through a competitive-selection process. The September 13, 2024, design-build agreement request for proposals says only that proponent may submit proposals. Its indicative timeline set a March 7, 2026, proposal deadline, less than three weeks after budget day, “subject to change.” Later amendments may have moved it.

In June 2026, the procurement approach changed. After the province and Cross Fraser Partnership failed to agree on commercial terms for final construction, the province exercised a termination option and moved to retender the remaining work in five packages. As of the June status report, early works were still being delivered by Cross Fraser Partnership.

Money has already gone out. Public Accounts 2025/26 show $143,188,050 in Consolidated Revenue Fund (core-government) payments to Cross Fraser Partnership that year. The June status report puts total project spending to date at $580.7 million.

In a report published October 13, CTV News quoted Premier David Eby saying: “We’re seeing bids come in, significantly lower than the original costing.” CTV reported that Eby “explained the higher estimate was not included in February’s budget because the project cost had not been finalized and the government was still assessing bids.”

The September report still shows $8,492 million. Eby has not publicly said which bids he meant. Infrastructure BC’s project page lists July 13 and August 11, 2026, as closing dates for qualification submissions on two of the five packages, including GC-1, the immersed-tube package. No priced proposals for the main construction packages are public; GC-1’s request for qualifications sets an anticipated proposals deadline of December 7, 2026.

What the record does not answer

Coastal Front found nothing in the public record that explains why the June status report, whose file metadata show it was created after the July 6 announcement, does not mention the new figure, or why Infrastructure BC’s page still lists $4.15 billion and 2030.

Coastal Front also found no published record of when, if at all, Treasury Board approved $8.5 billion. And the public record does not yet show what form the federal contribution — described by BC as up to $3 billion — will take: grant, loan or credit facility.

Two dates on the public record are still ahead. The federal agreement’s Annex A lists “Detailed arrangements for the financial commitments related to the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project” under “On or before December 1, 2026.” The anticipated GC-1 proposals deadline is December 7.

BC’s party leaders offered voters competing routes to lower costs and better services Wednesday night, with David Eby defending the NDP’s spending record and his challengers questioning why another round of promises would produce different results.

The only scheduled televised leaders’ debate before the October 24 election brought Eby, interim Conservative leader Lorne Doerkson and Green Leader Emily Lowan together in Vancouver. Their proposals face a common financial constraint: the province is forecasting a record $13.8-billion deficit for 2026–27.

The September fiscal update put the projected shortfall $450 million above the February budget estimate. The Finance Ministry identified higher wildfire spending and refundable tax-credit costs among the pressures, alongside economic uncertainty from U.S. tariffs and other international disruptions. The figure is a forecast for the fiscal year, not a final audited result.

Eby argued that public spending had supported schools, hospitals and services, and warned against balancing the books through cuts that would hurt residents. Doerkson challenged the NDP to answer for its years in government, while Lowan questioned whether its latest commitments would survive beyond election day. The government’s September update also reported that 23 new schools and additions opened in September, providing space for 4,700 students.

Who pays for the promises

The NDP’s campaign costings, released hours before the debate, project a deficit of about $12 billion in 2028–29, The Canadian Press reported. That would be a reduction of roughly $2 billion over two years, leaving a large gap between provincial revenues and expenses.

The party says economic growth and higher taxes on the top 3.88 percent of income earners would pay for its new commitments. The plan does not project a balanced budget within those two years.

Doerkson’s alternative centres on lower taxes and faster growth. The Conservatives propose raising the provincial basic personal exemption from $13,216 to $32,000. The party says the change would cut annual provincial income taxes by about $1,000 for nearly every working British Columbian.

The Conservatives had not released complete platform costings by Wednesday’s debate. Eby repeatedly pressed Doerkson to explain how his promises would be financed. Speaking to reporters afterward, Doerkson said the platform would be released before people had an opportunity to vote. He argued during the debate that economic expansion would help reduce the deficit.

Lowan proposed a larger shift toward taxing wealth. The Greens’ published platform estimates that a one-time progressive levy on net wealth above $50 million would raise $22.2 billion, followed by annual wealth taxes generating about $5.4 billion a year. Those are party projections; the revenue would depend on implementing the taxes and collecting the amounts forecast.

Old promises face fresh scrutiny

The Greens would use additional revenue to support measures including universal child care, expanded transit and social housing. Lowan’s criticism of the NDP drew on a specific reversal in seniors’ care: seven long-term care projects paused by the government earlier this year are now the subject of a renewed election commitment.

The projects, in Abbotsford, Campbell River, Chilliwack, Delta, Fort St. John, Kelowna and Squamish, were put on hold in the February budget. The NDP now promises to move them forward, citing funding secured through a July agreement with Ottawa and a different construction model intended to reduce costs.

“This year’s election bribes are next year’s broken promises,” Lowan said during the televised debate.

Eby’s healthcare pitch includes tripling funding for the province’s U.S. recruitment campaign and adding 500 workers to expand home care. The Greens promise an integrated community health centre in every riding. Doerkson has proposed a $50-million emergency fund to help prevent rural service closures and support recruitment.

The affordability debate carries another example of a commitment that did not materialize. In February 2025, the government cancelled its promised $1,000 grocery rebate for households. Then-finance minister Brenda Bailey cited uncertainty over threatened U.S. tariffs and the need to preserve resources for core services.

On housing, the disagreement extended to how much government should direct construction. Doerkson argued that provincial rules had made building unnecessarily difficult; Eby countered that rolling back those rules would add bureaucracy. The Greens’ platform calls for restarting community and Indigenous housing funds, with a goal of building and protecting 26,000 homes a year.

Car insurance provided another direct comparison. The NDP promises to extend the freeze on basic ICBC rates for three more years, until spring 2030. The Conservatives propose a hybrid insurance system that would give people with serious injuries greater access to legal representation, alongside more consumer choice and a continuing public ICBC option.

The Conservative policy says the model would improve compensation while protecting affordability. Eby argued that reopening the system to more litigation risked higher premiums. Doerkson said during the debate that he would cap lawyers’ fees and keep rates competitive.

The race to election day

The leaders’ arguments about economic certainty also reached the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, known as DRIPA. Section 3 of the 2019 legislation requires the government, in consultation and co-operation with Indigenous peoples, to take measures to make provincial laws consistent with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Doerkson promised repeal, arguing that the law had created division. Eby defended partnerships with First Nations as essential to advancing major projects. Lowan backed implementation, citing First Nations’ calls for the province to do that work.

Asked why he had called an election only two years after the last vote, Eby argued that the NDP’s narrow majority limited its ability to act amid U.S. economic threats. Doerkson described the election call as opportunistic.

Speaking to reporters after the debate, Eby said, “I need a strong mandate from British Columbians.”

Lowan, meanwhile, said electoral reform would be a priority if the Greens held the balance of power in a minority legislature.

Polling conducted before the debate showed the Conservatives ahead, with the size of the gap varying by survey. Leger’s October 9–12 online poll of 1,000 BC adults put Conservative support at 42 percent among decided voters, the NDP at 40 percent and the Greens at nine percent. Leger also found 26 percent of respondents said they were likely to switch their vote. Leger says a conventional margin of error cannot be assigned to its non-probability sample.

An Ipsos survey conducted October 7–11 for Global BC put the Conservatives at 43 percent, the NDP at 38 percent and the Greens at 11 percent among decided voters. Neither poll measured the debate’s effect.

Voters can begin making their choices at advance polls from October 16 to 21. Final Voting Day is Saturday October 24, according to Elections BC.

In September 2024, ahead of the last provincial election, Coastal Front sat down with Eby for an exclusive interview about BC’s deteriorating finances. The latest reported year-end total provincial debt was already $107.46 billion.

We asked whether he intended to cut spending. Eby defended borrowing for infrastructure. Later, when we asked whether his government would eventually reach a balanced budget, he answered: “Oh, absolutely.”

Pressed for a timeline, he said: “Our goal is within the next term of government to be back to balance.”

That term is now ending early. BC remains in deficit, and the government projects no balanced budget through 2028-29.

With British Columbia’s provincial election approaching, new polling from the Angus Reid Institute suggests Premier David Eby faces a significant challenge in overcoming negative public perceptions of his leadership.

According to the survey, 78 percent of British Columbians offered something negative about Eby when asked what they disliked about him, compared with 46 percent who offered something positive when asked what they liked.

The most frequently cited criticisms involved perceived dishonesty, broken promises or opportunism (24 percent), followed by concerns about weak or ineffective leadership (20 percent). Another 12 percent raised issues involving government spending, deficits, debt or taxation.

Positive impressions were considerably less common. Eby’s personal character and leadership competence were each mentioned by 13 percent of respondents, while 12 percent cited his policies or NDP values.

The findings present a different picture for BC Conservative leader Lorne Doerkson, with a substantially larger share of respondents unable or unwilling to offer an assessment of the challenger.

While 55 percent offered something negative about Doerkson, 51 percent offered something positive. When asked what they liked about him, 31 percent said they did not know him or provided no answer. Another 29 percent fell into the same category when asked what they disliked.

Among uncertain voters, 55 percent were recorded as not knowing Doerkson or providing no answer when asked to identify something positive about him. Half (50 percent) gave those responses when asked what they disliked.

Where positive impressions of Doerkson have formed, respondents most frequently cited his conservative values, the prospect of change or a fresh start, and perceived honesty or integrity, each mentioned by 14 percent.

His leading criticisms involved conservative ideology or party values (18 percent), being unknown, untested or inexperienced (10 percent), and concerns involving social issues or more extreme elements within his party (10 percent).

The findings highlight a contrast ahead of the October 24 election: Eby faces substantial criticism of his leadership, while many British Columbians have yet to express a clear opinion about his Conservative opponent.

The Angus Reid Institute conducted the online survey October 1–3, 2026, among 1,013 British Columbia adults drawn from its online panel. Results were weighted using census demographics. Respondents answered separate, open-ended questions about what they liked and disliked about each leader, with responses subsequently grouped into themes. The findings reflect expressed perceptions rather than formal approval or disapproval ratings.

Andrew Johns breaks down Eby’s controversial remarks, Pattison’s contributions to BC’s economy, and the NDP government’s nearly $14 billion deficit.

Is the government punishing success while failing to address BC’s affordability crisis?

British Columbia’s luxury vehicle surtax dates back more than three decades. But the structure British Columbians face today is partly built around a base threshold that has not moved since 2006 — and newly released government records raise questions about how well the province has measured whether the tax is actually achieving its goals.

BC’s luxury vehicle tax works by increasing the PST rate as a vehicle’s price rises. For a non-zero-emission passenger vehicle bought from a GST-registered dealer, the rate starts at seven percent below $55,000, rises in steps to 10 percent at $57,000, then jumps to 15 percent at $125,000 and 20 percent at $150,000. The higher rate applies to the full taxable purchase price, not just the portion above the threshold.

The province introduced the surtax in 1993 on vehicles priced above $30,000. The base threshold was last increased in 2006, when it reached $55,000. When PST was reimplemented in 2013, the lower thresholds returned unchanged, and the $55,000 base threshold remains in place for non-zero-emission vehicles. There is no automatic inflation adjustment.

A threshold frozen in time

The vehicle market has changed considerably in the meantime.

According to a September 2021 Ministry of Finance analysis obtained through FOI and based on Statistics Canada data, the average purchase price of a new vehicle in BC rose from roughly $30,000 in 2002 to $49,000 in 2021. The ministry calculated that as a 63.3 percent increase over 19 years, or about 3.3 percent per year on average. It also noted that this was a nominal price increase, not an inflation measure: the Statistics Canada CPI data cited in the analysis showed passenger-vehicle purchase and lease costs had risen by about 13 percent relative to 2002.

The comparison does not mean the $55,000 threshold should necessarily have risen by 63.3 percent: the threshold was set in 2006, while the ministry’s price series begins in 2002, and there are different ways government could decide where a “luxury” threshold belongs. But the analysis illustrates how much vehicle prices changed while the base threshold remained fixed after 2006.

‘Not luxury items, but essential for families and workers’

That concern has also been raised by the industry.

Internal Ministry of Finance records show the BC Chamber of Commerce and the New Car Dealers Association of BC asked the province to raise the base threshold from $55,000 to $100,000. The Chamber also wanted it increased annually with the Consumer Price Index, while the dealer association argued that many vehicles being caught by the policy were “not luxury items, but essential for families and workers.”

A separate 2022 dealer-association submission cited vans, larger SUVs and pickup trucks used by families, businesses and people in resource communities as examples of vehicles it said were increasingly being captured by the tax. The BC Chamber reiterated its position in a 2024 policy resolution, calling for a threshold of at least $100,000 and regular increases tied to BC CPI.

A major change, however, came in 2018.

For dealer purchases, Budget 2018 raised the PST rate on passenger vehicles priced from $125,000 to $149,999.99 from 10 percent to 15 percent, and doubled the rate on vehicles priced at $150,000 or more from 10 percent to 20 percent. The changes took effect April 1, 2018.

And the government attached a measurable fiscal expectation to them.

Budget 2018’s tax-measures table attributed a $10-million taxpayer impact in 2018/19 and another $10 million in 2019/20 to the increase in luxury surtax rates on passenger vehicles over $125,000.

That prompted an obvious question: did the additional revenue actually materialize?

Coastal Front previously asked the Ministry of Finance how much PST the province collects from vehicles taxed in the 15 and 20 percent brackets. The ministry said it could not provide a breakdown, explaining that it receives PST from ICBC and motor vehicle dealers in lump sums and that the revenue “is not broken down to show the amount of PST that comes from different types of vehicles.”

That answer prompted a broader question: if the ministry cannot provide a breakdown of what the higher luxury brackets collect, what evidence does it use to determine whether the policy is meeting its objectives?

Coastal Front subsequently filed a freedom-of-information request specifically seeking records from 2018 through 2024 discussing the surtax’s efficacy — whether it met its intended policy goals.

The resulting production contains hundreds of pages of briefing notes, policy discussions, industry submissions and internal correspondence, with some material redacted or withheld.

Coastal Front found no clear comparison in the disclosed records between the 2018 revenue estimate and the actual fiscal result.

The missing scorecard

Some of the most revealing records instead show limitations in the information Ministry of Finance officials were using to review the tax.

On September 22, 2021, Tax Policy Branch official Keith Preston wrote that the surtax was frequently raised by the public, industry and legislative committees and that the branch “regularly reviews the appropriateness of the surtax design” through the budget process.

In the same email, Preston wrote that staff relied on publicly available manufacturers’ suggested retail prices and had “relatively little information” about the prevalence of particular makes, models and trim levels in new vehicle sales in BC.

An email exchange from the previous month provides more detail.

Jonah Glass, then director of Data and Modelling Services at the Ministry of Finance, told colleagues the ministry could provide lists of commonly purchased vehicles and that “maybe someone can do some manual work to look up prices.” Another official proposed compiling minimum and maximum prices for popular vehicles to determine which models reached the luxury range and what features pushed them over it.

Those exchanges do not establish that the ministry lacked all relevant sales, registration or tax data. But they do establish that more than three years after the 2018 rate increase, officials reviewing the policy acknowledged having limited information about the make, model and trim-level mix of new vehicles actually being sold.

Collecting less tax as a result?

Meanwhile, within months of the 2018 change, dealers were warning that the higher rates could change buyer behaviour in ways that reduced PST collections.

In October 2018, New Car Dealers Association president Blair Qualey told a legislative committee that, based on conversations with members, “a number” of large dealers selling high-end vehicles had seen what he understood to be a 33 percent decrease in PST collected. He attributed the decline to customers purchasing or registering vehicles in other jurisdictions and argued the government was collecting less tax as a result.

The claim raised broader questions about the surtax’s efficacy: was it reducing BC-taxable sales, shifting transactions elsewhere, or otherwise changing buyer behaviour? Those effects could potentially show up in transaction and registration patterns.

Coastal Front found no clear analysis in the disclosed FOI records examining those effects.

That is notable because the same FOI package shows the Ministry of Finance making forward-looking estimates of other changes to the surtax. In one analysis, officials estimated that temporarily raising the base surtax threshold for zero-emission vehicles to $75,000 would have fiscal-plan impacts of $12 million in 2022/23, $15 million in 2023/24 and $20 million in 2024/25, alongside estimated greenhouse-gas savings.

The province could estimate what a change to the surtax was expected to do. What the released record does not show is a comparable after-the-fact assessment of the 2018 increase. Forecasts alone cannot establish whether a policy worked as intended.

‘Fairness’

Ministry of Finance briefing material says the surtax is intended to improve fairness by asking people who can afford more expensive vehicles to pay more. The government also expected the 2018 increase to bring in more revenue.

That leaves the central question: did the tax actually bring in more money, or did changes in buyer behaviour undermine some of that gain?

Coastal Front sought the government’s own records discussing the surtax’s efficacy — specifically, whether it met its intended policy goals. Yet the material released through FOI contains no clear after-the-fact accounting of the 2018 increase and no clear assessment answering that question.

Government can show what it hoped the tax would accomplish. What the released record still does not show is whether it actually worked — or whether a policy framed as a way to make the tax system fairer may also have eroded some of the revenue it was expected to raise.

David Eby has made buying BC and Canadian a prominent part of his pitch to voters.

And he has specifically pointed to BC Ferries as an example.

Speaking to the Union of BC Municipalities on September 18, Eby promised: “I will be directing BC Ferries to ensure that the next generation of BC Ferries vessels will be built right here in British Columbia.”

His message was clear: major spending should benefit British Columbians.

Eby also highlighted BC Ferries’ efforts to buy local food. BC Ferries says more than 60 percent of the food served onboard comes from BC, including 100 percent of the eggs used in its breakfasts.

But another major BC Ferries purchase raises questions about how far that Buy Canadian commitment extends.

BC Ferries issued a request for proposals for diesel fuel and aqueous urea solution on November 21, 2025. Bidding closed in February. Public procurement records list the competition as closed but do not identify the successful bidder.

BC Ferries has had a long-standing relationship with Parkland Corporation as a fuel supplier.

That company is no longer independently Canadian-owned.

U.S.-based Sunoco completed its acquisition of Parkland on October 31, 2025, three weeks before BC Ferries issued the fuel RFP. Parkland became a wholly owned subsidiary within Sunoco’s corporate structure.

Sunoco is controlled through Texas-based Energy Transfer. U.S. election records show Energy Transfer contributed US$12.5 million to MAGA Inc. in February 2025. Executive chairman Kelcy Warren contributed another US$12.5 million.

BC Ferries may operate at arm’s length from government, but the premier has publicly said he will direct the company when it comes to building ferries in BC, while pointing to its local food purchases as evidence of the benefits of buying close to home.

The fuel procurement now puts that position under closer scrutiny.

Former Vancouver Mayor Kennedy Stewart sits down with Coastal Front for a candid, no-holds-barred conversation about Ken Sim, the UBC SkyTrain, policing, property taxes and the future of Vancouver ahead of the 2026 municipal election.

Stewart looks back on his time as an NDP MP and his 2018–2022 term as mayor of Vancouver: leading a split city council, getting the city through COVID, helping bring the FIFA World Cup to BC, and securing funding for the Broadway Plan and the SkyTrain extension to UBC. He explains why he believes the UBC SkyTrain line was fully funded when he left office, what went wrong under Mayor Ken Sim, and why he says Sim “had four years to deliver.”

We also get into:
🔹 Why he says he was “never about defunding police,” and how he thinks Sim’s 100-officer pledge drove up property taxes
🔹 Housing affordability, rental housing, super towers and the Carney–Eby housing announcement
🔹 Whether Metro Vancouver’s cities should amalgamate
🔹 Party discipline in Ottawa, his book with Michael Chong, and working with Harper, Trudeau, Singh and Carney
🔹 Whether he’ll ever run for office again

Stewart looks back on his time as an NDP MP and his 2018–2022 term as mayor of Vancouver: leading a split city council, getting the city through COVID, helping bring the FIFA World Cup to BC, and securing funding for the Broadway Plan and the SkyTrain extension to UBC. He explains why he believes the UBC SkyTrain line was fully funded when he left office, what went wrong under Mayor Ken Sim, and why he says Sim "had four years to deliver."

We also get into:

🔹 Why he says he was "never about defunding police," and how he thinks Sim's 100-officer pledge drove up property taxes

🔹 Housing affordability, rental housing, super towers and the Carney–Eby housing announcement

🔹 Whether Metro Vancouver's cities should amalgamate

🔹 Party discipline in Ottawa, his book with Michael Chong, and working with Harper, Trudeau, Singh and Carney

🔹 Whether he'll ever run for office again

Watch the full conversation here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WN2ldaukk8k