Canada’s Aid to Mali: A Deeper Look
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From 2010 to 2021, Canada has sent a combined total of $56,877,707 to a “semi-autonomous” agency located in the African country of Mali: the Office du Niger. The agency seeks to develop Mali’s irrigation and agriculture systems. However, security issues, worrying poverty statistics, and a lack of substantial results for the Malian people have critics concerned.
The Situation in Mali
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Mali is a former French colonial state in Africa, which in recent decades has suffered political instability and has raised concerns from international eyes. Most recently, in 2021, the country endured a military coup that toppled interim president Bah N’Daw’s regime, following a more peaceful removal of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s government a year before in 2020.
There are also active terrorist groups in the country, which, in addition to crime and political instability, have prompted the Canadian government to issue an “avoid all travel” warning for Mali as of the current year. This leaves the question of why the Canadian government is sending funds to support agriculture infrastructure, while the country's political instability leaves the working class of Mali unable to reap the benefits.
Coastal Front reached out to Global Affairs Canada to confirm and ask for the reasoning behind the funding sent to Office du Niger. Global Affairs claims that their efforts are to “support Mali's poorest and most vulnerable populations.”
However, the contributions of the Office du Niger to the welfare of the Malinese people is questionable to some, as according to the World Bank, almost 20 percent of the country is still below the poverty line, with 90 percent of that demographic living in rural areas. This highlights an issue in proper resource distribution amongst the people of Mali.
Performance of the Office
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The Office du Niger is originally a French colonial project developed in the 1920s in Mali while it was ruled under colonialism, with its construction and assemblage uprooting tens of thousands of the native population, while also producing a tiny amount of agricultural product and generating no profit. Despite this, the program was still fully adopted by the Malian government after achieving independence from France in the 1960s.
The Office du Niger’s goals are to “enhance and develop the Central Delta of the Niger River for Mali's food sovereignty.” This is done through chanelling and manipulating the powerful Niger river to irrigate the areas of Mali in the Sahara desert. The Sahara has been previously “green” in relatively recent human history, so the project is not an impossible scheme, especially with recent news about how climate change is affecting the area.
Global Affairs notes that the program's key achievements since 2016 have been the “rehabilitation of over 200 km of irrigation infrastructure” and the “establishment of 17 communal water management committees.”
Since the 1990s, the program has gradually improved its agricultural growth, but many have noticed it hasn’t stabilized Mali’s communities as promised. A Brazilian study conducted in the Office du Niger’s operating area found that “many farmers were fighting to ensure basic needs” due to unregulated water fees on them, despite being the core element to the Office du Niger project. Agricultural inputs are also heavily subsidized by the Malian government.
The study also noted that foreign investment has “resulted in the displacement of some villages and prevented the gardening and rainy culture of millet,” which creates “more problems than it solves.”
It is also important to note that the program completely collapsed in 2012 due to political instability, and was restarted in 2016, the same year that the Canadian government transferred a total of $21 million to the Office du Niger before further evaluation of the project.
The Bigger Picture
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In addition to problems with the actual infrastructure of Office du Niger, the political instability of Mali makes it difficult for the citizens of the country to see the proper distribution of resources from the agricultural project.
Global Affairs stated that after the 2021 coup, no further funding has been provided and any future engagement with Mali’s government “will first undergo a new assessment of finances, human-rights safeguards, and political risks under Canada’s post-coup rules.”
However, these issues of “human-rights safeguards” and “political risks” haven’t been on Canada’s radar in the past when providing funding for the Office du Niger. In 2018, there were widespread reports of violence during the national elections, with 20 percent of polling stations being affected by this issue, according to Freedom House. Internet access was also blocked ahead of the runoff vote, marking a seemingly anti-democratic political environment.
Keïta’s government, before it was ousted, was also accused of manipulating courts to push opposition candidates out of their elected seats to maintain a party majority in the legislature.
The Canadian government seems to be arbitrarily picking and choosing when a country’s regime is respecting “human-rights safeguards” and addressing “political risks” when it comes to foreign aid. Almost $57 million in payments have been made to the Office du Niger over the years at the expense of the Canadian taxpayer, with mediocre or even poor results for the people of Mali it is supposed to benefit.
