Ottawa’s $450-million question: What are we funding in Haiti?

Canada has announced more than $11 million in humanitarian assistance following Hurricane Melissa, which devastated parts of the Caribbean in late October, damaging homes and infrastructure and disrupting local economies.

While this aid targets immediate relief, it underscores how deeply Canada is financially embedded in the Caribbean — not only through humanitarian projects but also longer-term, “security-oriented” programs. In nearby Haiti, Ottawa’s commitments have surpassed $450 million since 2022, much of it tied to foreign-directed missions and complex funding mechanisms with limited public scrutiny.

Canada’s Haiti spending grows while mission goals shift and oversight questions linger

Canada’s latest $60-million pledge to Haiti, announced in September, folds into a tab that has, as mentioned, surpassed $450 million since 2022, with another $40 million set to move if a new UN Security Council blueprint lands. Ottawa says the spending backs “Haitian-led stability.” But two decades of foreign missions, a thin, externally directed deployment in Port-au-Prince, and a new maritime-security program across the Caribbean raise a basic question for Canadians: what are we buying, and who is accountable if it doesn’t work? If anything is clear, repeated Western meddling hasn’t helped ordinary Haitians.

Announced during UN week in New York, the package earmarks $40 million for the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, or its successor, conditional on a Security Council resolution on Haiti. That means Canadian taxpayers could continue to bankroll a “Kenyan-led” operation, a label critics argue is a fig leaf for a mission shaped by Washington.

The UN adopted Resolution 2699 in October 2023, authorizing the MSS that Kenya “volunteered” to lead. Global Affairs says the mission aims to “stabilize security conditions conducive to holding inclusive, free and fair elections in Haiti.”

Since February 2024, Canada has provided more than $86 million to support the Kenya-led MSS.

From the Core Group to today’s MSS

The “save Haiti from criminals” narrative is not new. In 1915, the United States invaded to fight “bandits” and occupied the country until 1934, creating a national army that later enforced elite rule and supported the Duvalier dictatorship. After the 1986 déchoukaj uprising, paramilitary networks were never fully dismantled; many figures re-entered politics rather than being held to account.

Fast-forward to 2003, when Canadian, US and French officials met behind closed doors in Ottawa and at Meech Lake — meetings later known as the Ottawa Initiative — without Haitian participation. Access-to-Information records obtained by MP Paul Manly’s office and reported by The Breach confirm Canada hosted the meetings and show that, after l’Actualité reported discussions about removing President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and a possible UN trusteeship, Canadian officials drafted rebuttal lines. In February 2004, a Canadian memo canvassed options “from military intervention forces to small additions of civilians to monitor and observe,” as reported by The Breach. As Aristide departed, Canadian special forces secured the Port-au-Prince airport, and the RCMP later trained and vetted the reconstituted Haitian National Police.

Ottawa denies planning a trusteeship or orchestrating the ouster, but the records show Canadian officials anticipated intervention scenarios in the weeks leading up to the change in power.

The UN then formalized the Core Group alongside MINUSTAH (2004–2017). The mission reached roughly 10,000 personnel at points and left a controversial record: a cholera outbreak linked to UN troops, documented sexual abuse, and a widely held view among Haitian critics that repeated deployments weakened institutions rather than building them.

Total Canadian disbursements by area of intervention from 2006-2013 in Haiti. Graph from Global Affairs Canada.

Post-quake electoral engineering deepened the crisis. In 2010–11, international actors, including the OAS review and pressure from then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, helped move Michel Martelly into the runoff amid disputed results; later, Jovenel Moïse won amid low turnout and legitimacy questions. By 2021, institutions had hollowed out. After Moïse’s assassination, the Core Group publicly endorsed Ariel Henry as prime minister despite the absence of a sitting parliament, described in Haitian media as leadership “by statement.”

From there, the path to a new foreign mission was straightforward. The United States, with support from Mexico, drafted the proposal for a “Multinational Security Support Mission” and brought it to the UN Security Council. Canada, as part of the CORE Group, backed the initiative. The UN approved the mission but emphasized that it was not a UN operation, only sanctioned by the organization.

Calling the MSS “Kenyan-led” masks the structure, to an extent. Strategy, money and conditions are largely set outside Haiti; Kenya fronts the deployment while North American and multilateral actors shape design and financing. In effect, the MSS carries forward the Core Group model: decisions coordinated abroad, implemented through a partner state, and presented as a security fix to a political and humanitarian crisis.

The MSS mission

Canada’s military contribution, Operation HELIOS, trains CARICOM personnel for the Kenya-led MSS and supports logistics; Ottawa separately proposes $20 million for a Regional Maritime Security Initiative targeting arms and narcotics flows in Haiti and the wider Caribbean.

The $40 million isn’t guaranteed; it hinges on UN authorization to restructure and expand a mission that critics say still lacks public rules of engagement, transparent oversight, and a coherent governance chain. The maritime plan extends beyond Haiti’s borders into coordination and information-sharing across CARICOM, with civil-liberties and transparency implications Ottawa has yet to detail.

Ottawa’s umbrella claim — “more than $450 million since 2022” — folds in humanitarian and development spending alongside these security lines. Based on that figure and the identifiable security subtotal, $206 million, the rest sits in non-security categories: humanitarian relief, development programming, governance and justice projects, and civil-society funding, which often fall under the category of “strategic communications,” since they aim to influence public opinion. You can read more about that HERE.

An ill-defined mission

By mid-2024, only a small advance team of Kenyan police had arrived in Port-au-Prince, far short of the roughly 2,500 personnel that was expected. Even Kenya’s president acknowledged the deployment fell far short. Critics note no public ROE, unclear oversight, and fragmented authority across the UN mandate.

Ottawa describes Canada as a leading funder providing training, equipment and logistical support to the mission. In Parliament, MPs have questioned officials about potential aid diversion and whether funds or gear could reach armed groups. Global Affairs cited UN trust-fund safeguards and said there has been no known misuse since 2022.

The maritime initiative

The $20-million Regional Maritime Security Initiative funds efforts to curb arms and drug trafficking through cooperation with CARICOM and G7 partners, including new information-sharing systems and legal-capacity support. Ottawa frames it as a way to stem the flow of US-sourced firearms into Haiti and the wider Caribbean. Critics warn that, without clear safeguards on data-sharing or public accountability, the initiative could evolve into a regional policing network with little democratic oversight.

How we got here: Ottawa Initiative, coup and the occupation years

As previously mentioned, in 2003, Canadian, US and French officials met behind closed doors in Ottawa and at Meech Lake. Documents and reporting describe discussions that included the possibility of removing President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and placing Haiti under UN trusteeship. After l’Actualité revealed those talks, Canadian officials drafted lines to manage the fallout. In February 2004, as Aristide was flown out of the country, Canadian special forces secured the Port-au-Prince airport, and the RCMP later helped train and vet the rebuilt Haitian police. Ottawa has denied planning a trusteeship or orchestrating Aristide’s ouster.

From 2004 to 2017, the UN’s MINUSTAH mission deployed about 10,000 personnel at its peak. Its record remains contentious: a cholera outbreak linked to UN troops, sexual-abuse scandals, and accusations that repeated foreign deployments weakened Haiti’s institutions, including the very police force Canada continues to fund.

After the 2021 assassination of Jovenel Moïse, the Core Group, including Canada and the UN political office, signalled support for Ariel Henry as institutions buckled, a move opponents say was externally imposed. As the US and Canada shopped for a state to lead, Kenya emerged despite legal challenges at home. Western officials, including Canada’s high commissioner, attended a key Kenyan parliamentary vote authorizing deployment. The arrangement, known as Operation HELIOS, advances a proxy architecture. It’s Kenyan-led in name, while Western funders manage strategy, logistics and overall direction.

After years of backing interventions that have done little to strengthen Haitian sovereignty, Ottawa faces a familiar question: whether its money is building stability, or just financing another cycle of dependence and control.